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Anya Daly’s Merleau-Ponty and the Ethics of  Intersubjectivity raises timely questions about 
the human condition, ethical motivation, and the limitations of relying on normative, 
ethical paradigms to improve that condition and motivation. Particularly telling is 
Daly’s question in the “Acknowledgments” section headlining the book: “Why despite 
astonishing advances in knowledge and science do people persist in destructiveness?” 
(xi). The destructiveness to which she refers includes “the psychological and political 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion . . . set in motion” (4) with respect to “the 
refugee and the terrorist” (3). Daly applies recent research in psychology, neuroscience, 
and phenomenology to defend Merleau-Pontian intersubjectivity as an antidote to 
destructiveness, and as a necessary supplement to ethical norms. 
In chapter one she criticizes the normative paradigms of utilitarianism, deontology, 
and virtue ethics as being “‘high altitude’ in that they invoke a higher authority than 
the subject . . .” (2). Deontology, for example, fails to unify people with diverse 
“religious or metaphysical allegiances . . .” (6-7); utilitarianism struggles to discriminate 
benefits from harms over a lengthy, future span of time; and virtue ethics lacks 
“justifications” for determining which virtues should be extolled (7). While Daly 
acknowledges that Merleau-Ponty “never developed an ethics per se” (2), she finds his 
account of embodied perception crucial to recovering “the Other as an-other suffering 
fellow human being” (4). To redress the suffering of the Other, Daly prescribes an 
ethics of empathy, but specifically not an empathy of “cognitive apprehension” that 
arises reflectively or reactively within agents (31). On the contrary, Daly identifies and 
defends an “embodied” empathy (32) that “co-arises with access” to others (31). As I 
read Daly, it is the inferior, reflective sort of empathy that fosters the attitudinal latency 
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prone to interference from high-altitude ethical norms. 
The first step toward understanding an ethics of intersubjectivity, then, is to 
understand how the Merleau-Pontian becomes conscious of another person. One 
argument that Merleau-Ponty rejects for the existence of other minds, as Daly explains 
in chapter two, is the argument from analogy. The reddening, scrunched face of 
another human being is not a sign of an angry mind-like-mine; my embodied 
interlocutor rather has an angry face, an anger that I (qua Merleau-Pontian) readily 
apprehend (41, 51). The existences of other people are not inferred by the Merleau-
Pontian, they are remembered or re-examined after being experienced (47).  
Daly cautions, however, that proposing both a self and an Other (human or object) 
perennially risks either a solipsistic monism that reduces the Other to a projection of 
the self, or a substance dualism that invites skepticism about non-mental entities (61). 
Hence she devotes chapters three through five to defending Merleau-Ponty’s 
reversibility thesis, which in her words claims that “[t]he Other . . . is essential for self-
awareness and vice versa” (65). The Merleau-Pontian avoids both monism and dualism, 
Daly claims, if “the ultimate reversibility . . . holds between the Visible (phenomena) 
and the Invisible (language, reflection and expression) . . .” (63). Visible and Invisible are 
Merleau-Ponty’s terms, and in chapter three, Daly demonstrates Visible reversibility in 
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of self-touch — of a two-handed agent touching one hand 
with the other. As touching and being touched are perceptually reversible but non-
identical experiences, so Daly argues that the Other cannot reduce to a projection of 
the self if the Other is experienced as manipulating the self ’s “familiar objects” in the 
world, “moving and acting in [the self ’s] familiar space” (78). Multiple, embodied selves 
reversibly experience the transgression of space in a single “world,” Daly explains, just 
as two hands reverse the “touching/touched” experiences in a single body (79). 
In chapter four, Daly examines reversibility within the Invisible, and switches her 
target from monism to mind-body dualism. She analyzes the relationships of self to 
language, language to world, and linguist to linguist, but before doing so, primes the 
intuition that agents can enter reversible relationships qua thinkers, rather than merely 
qua two-handed. She references Husserl for this task, observing that an agent’s very act 
of self-reflection “splits [the agent] into the reflected and the reflecting . . . . [which] 
provides a basis for self-alienation . . . and thereby establishes conditions for the 
recognition of an-Other” (96). As the Visible agent co-opts real estate with an-Other, so 
I interpret the self-reflector (qua self-reflector) to recognize a mutually sustained existence 
with the reflected self. Due to the Visible reversibility already defended by Daly, the 
embodied self-reflector will not project a solipsistic world into monistic existence. But 
could she instead ascribe substantial isolation to her generative, reflecting mind and 
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end up a dualist?  
Daly argues no, relying in part on Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the relationships of 
thought to language and language to concrete world. As she quotes Merleau-Ponty: 
“‘thought tends towards expression as towards its completion’” (95). Paraphrasing 
another quote, she adds that “thought/reflection . . . has a tendency to evanesce unless 
articulated . . .” (94). Plainly, these claims capture Merleau-Ponty’s observation that 
thoughts bereft of language become forgotten or stunted, but as I read Daly, this 
necessity of communication for the survival of thought reigns in the dualist by keeping 
thought in and about the world (134-135). To the objection that abstract thought such 
as that of a perfect triangle must be an idea substantially distinct from anything 
experienced, Daly counters that “ideas arise out of the instances of situated expression,” 
and she quotes Merleau-Ponty’s argument that the terms “‘angle’” and “‘direction’” 
cannot be deciphered apart from real or imagined experience of space (96). Thus Daly 
defends a reversibility between language and thought to secure a larger, anti-dualist 
reversibility between the Visible and Invisible. She uncovers additional instances of 
reversibility through an extensive investigation of Merleau-Pontian aesthetics. 
Chapter five entertains objections to reversibility, however, from Claude Lefort and 
Emmanuel Levinas. By Daly’s accounting, Lefort holds that the asymmetry of 
experience between subjects undermines the reversibility of such experience (141), and 
Levinas argues that the theorization of ontology in general proves too “homogenizing” 
to accommodate Merleau-Ponty’s anti-monism (155, quoting Daly; 157). Contrary to 
Lefort, Daly argues that asymmetry “guarantee[s] the irreducibility of the Other,” 
because selves and objects just do exhibit “contingency and opacity” (145, emphasis 
mine), and “are constantly changing” (144). Her reply to Levinas, on the other hand, 
references contemporary neuroscience. Daly claims that human agents “experience 
attraction, repulsion or indifference [to an-Other] before information about the 
cognitive significance [of the Other] is noted . . .” (164). Human “perception,” in other 
words, “is already affectively informed . . .” (164). Hence she claims to corroborate 
Merleau-Pontian perception as a pre-reflective, non-monistic “engagement” with the 
Other (165), and proposes mirror neurons in the brain as vehicles for “direct 
perception” of the Other in chapter six (206). 
To directly perceive the Other, however, is not yet on Daly’s account to “respon[d]” 
ethically or unethically to the Other (177), and so Daly deepens her discussion of 
empathy in chapter seven. She identifies empathy as an “affective reversibility” 
between agents (225), and argues in chapter eight that empathy “underpins and 
motivates all particular ethical considerations and manifestations of ethical behaviour” 
(250). Indeed, empathy constitutes “a necessary condition for ethics” (264), on Daly’s 
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account, a condition that critically supports normative “principles” such as 
deontological universalism and utilitarian’s “everyone considered” principle (267). She 
concludes the book with chapter nine, summarizing her claims and relating several 
Merleau-Pontian themes to Buddhist teachings. 
In sum, Daly presents an extraordinarily balanced, accessible, and illuminating 
text. I complain only that its breadth leaves some contentious problems unresolved. 
Daly claims, for example, that we do “not feel moral responsibility . . . towards God, 
who presumably is beyond the harms of ethical failures” (266). Why shuffle out of the 
deck those ethicists who identify a virtue of gratitude toward the divine and a 
responsibility to nourish such gratitude as a habit? Could not such a virtue comprise 
one principle supportable by an empathic telos? Secondly, I wonder if a Turing Test 
objection befits one of Daly’s quotations of Merleau-Ponty, namely: “through speech I 
am ‘brought into the presence of another myself [...]’” (107). For the sake of argument, I 
assume it to be less than obvious how to program empathy into a robot. Hence even a 
conversational robot would on Daly’s account be a moral embarrassment: an-Other 
who only follows high-altitude normativities (e.g. expected value, tit-for-tat, Isamov 
laws). Would dialogue remain a reversibility even if the experience of dialogue was not 
reversible? The relationship between empathy and language remains mysterious in 
Daly’s book. On the other hand, perhaps such are the relationships that she wants us to 
investigate. 
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